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Governmental administrative agencies routinely create legitimate expectations,1 not 
least on the part of non-governmental agents,2 concerning future administrative 
conduct.3 It is an unfortunate but unavoidable fact of life, however, that these agencies 
often find themselves unable to fulfil those expectations for various reasons.4 How 
governmental administrative agencies should handle the fact that they have created 
and then frustrated such legitimate expectations has already been discussed in the 
literature; indeed, I have argued elsewhere that such authorities have a prima facie 
obligation to pay adequate compensation in respect of damage or losses directly 
resulting from frustrated legitimate expectations.5 The present article is concerned 
with a prior question: what makes expectations legitimate in the first place? 
 Legitimate expectations, and here I am speaking of the general concept, possess 
three hallmarks. The first is that, qua expectations, they are predictive—meaning that 
they are partially constituted by beliefs or predictions about what will or will not 
happen in the future. Expectations can be about future events or states of affair. One 
might listen to an official weather forecast, for example, and develop an expectation 
                                                 
*The article grew out of conversations I had with Fergus Green, Matt Matravers, David Miller, and 
Margaret Moore about the legitimacy of expectations whilst attending a workshop on legitimate 
expectations at the University of Graz in 2016, organised by Lukas H. Meyer and Pranay 
Sanklecha. For their acute criticisms and suggestions concerning earlier drafts of the article, I am 
also indebted to the editor of, and two anonymous reviewers for, The Journal of Political 
Philosophy. 
1Be they procedural or substantive.  For an overview of the legal distinction between procedural and 
substantive legitimate expectations, see Soren Schonberg, Legitimate Expectations in 
Administrative Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 111–2 and Paul Craig, 
Administrative Law, Eighth Edition (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2016), pp. 677–8. 
2Among them individual citizens, groups, businesses, organisations, institutions, and instrumentalities.   
3The expectations in question might concern administrative policies (e.g., secondary legislation, 
general rules, regulations, and policy statements) or administrative measures (e.g., particular 
administrative orders, decisions, and adjudications that relate to a single agent or small number of 
identifiable agents). 
4Reasons of justice, the public interest (where distinct from justice), severe financial constraints, or 
sometimes harsh political realities. 
5See Alexander Brown, “Justifying compensation for frustrated legitimate expectations,” Law and 
Philosophy, 30 (2011), 699−728. 
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that the storm will probably hit one’s town. But expectations can also be about 
whether someone, including a governmental administrative agent or agency, will do 
or not do something in the future. One might have an expectation that if the storm 
does hit one’s town, then a government agency will open up its storm shelters for use 
by local residents. In this study I shall focus on expectations about what governmental 
administrative agents or agencies will do or not do in the future.  
A second hallmark of legitimate expectations is that, although they are partially 
constituted by beliefs or predictions about the future, they are also prescriptive—
meaning that they involve an agent’s expectation about what some other agent or 
agency should do or not do in the future.6 One might expect, in the prescriptive sense, 
that a government agency should open up its storm shelters for use by local residents. 
Now agents can end up with many different sorts of prescriptive expectations 
and in many different ways. But clearly not all these expectations will be legitimate. 
Thus, a third hallmark of legitimate expectations is that they are not baseless but 
instead justifiable, meaning that the agent has epistemic justification or warrant for 
expecting, in both the predictive and prescriptive senses, that some other agent, such 
as a governmental administrative agent or agency, will and should do or not do 
something in the future. What is more, it is perfectly normal for people to draw on 
their other normative beliefs as epistemic justifications for their prescriptive 
expectations.  
But what makes for justifiable expectations? This article critically examines 
three existing answers to this question found in the literature (section I).7 It then 
introduces and defends a new answer, what I term the Responsibility-Based Account 
(section II). On this new account, the legitimacy of expectations depends not on 
whether these expectations are based on laws or legal entitlements nor on the 
substantive justice of the expectations nor on the justice of the basic structure that 
forms the background to these expectations nor on the legitimate authority of the 
governmental administrative agents or agencies whose actions or omissions are the 
subject of these expectations. On the Responsibility-Based Account, the legitimacy of 
                                                 
6I borrow the distinction between predictive and prescriptive expectations from M. L. Houser, “Are we 
violating their expectations? Instructor communication expectations of traditional and 
nontraditional students,” Communication Quarterly, 53 (2005), 213–28. 
7For an overview, see Lukas H. Meyer and Pranay Sanklecha, “Individual expectations and climate 
justice,” Analyse & Kritik, 33 (2011), 449–71; Lukas H. Meyer and Pranay Sanklecha, “How 
legitimate expectations matter in climate justice,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 13 (2014), 
369–93. 
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expectations depends instead on the role played by governmental administrative 
agents or agencies in bringing about the relevant beliefs or predictions after their 
having been given or having assumed a role responsibility, competence, or discretion 
for making decisions about the administrative policies and measures which are the 
subjects of those expectations. If agent A credibly believes that governmental 
administrative agent or agency G was responsible for, or can be “credited” (if that is 
the right word) with, bringing about A’s beliefs or predictions that G will x 
(action/omission), after G had been given or had assumed a role responsibility, 
competence, or discretion for making decisions about x, then it is justifiable for A to 
affirm that G should x. In other words, if G tried to claim that A has no basis on which 
to affirm that G should x, A can reasonable say to G the following, “Since you led me 
to expect that you would x, you now really ought to x.” In setting out this account I 
also try to elaborate the complex theory of responsibility that it presupposes (section 
III).  
 Following on from all this, I set forth and defend what I call the Principle of 
Legitimate Expectations in Public Administration (the Legitimate Expectations 
Principle, for short). That Principle holds that any governmental administrative agents 
or agencies that were responsible for creating legitimate expectations on the part of 
non-governmental agents, or, indeed, other public bodies or even public employees, 
have a prima facie obligation to fulfil rather than frustrate those legitimate 
expectations (section IV). I also make some tentative suggestions about what sort of 
more abstract or general normative standard this principle might be derived from. 
 Finally, I offer some brief clarifications of my position on the relationship 
between legitimate expectations, justice, and legitimate authority (section V). 
 
 
I. EXISTING ACCOUNTS OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS 
 
I shall begin by outlining three existing accounts of legitimate expectations. The first 
is the Law-Based Account. According to this account, talk of legitimate expectations 
is shorthand for the sort of beliefs or predictions about the future, as well as the sort of 
prescriptive claims about the future, that are based on a system of law and legal 
entitlements, as opposed to merely social customs, habits, or conventions (pre-legal). 
In other words, the term “legitimate” functions to flag up the fact that an expectation 
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of x is grounded in a set of formalised and coercively enforced public rules which 
have determined that a person has a legal entitlement to x. 
 The idea that expectations based on a system of law and legal entitlements are 
important and should be protected is present in Jeremy Bentham’s doctrine of 
security, of course. The doctrine begins with what Bentham takes to be the 
uncontroversial observation that “expectation, as far as the law can be kept present to 
men’s minds, follows with undeviating obsequiousness the finger of the law.”8 In 
other words, knowing that he or she enjoys a legal entitlement to x invariably creates 
in the mind of the individual an expectation of x. Moreover, according to Bentham, 
experience tells us that both the strength and longevity of expectations are highly 
sensitive to their being founded upon legal entitlements. In his Principles of the Civil 
Code, for example, he contrasts the savage who expects that he will be able to enjoy 
the deer that he has killed based on only his guile and strength with a person living 
under a system of law who expects that he will be able to enjoy the deer that he has 
purchased based on his legal entitlement to that property.9 Bentham believes that we 
should adopt, as a guide to public action, the “principle of security,” which “requires 
that events, so far as they depend upon laws, should conform to the expectations 
which law itself has created.”10 For example, “[a]s regards property, security consists 
in receiving no check, no shock, no derangement to the expectation founded on the 
laws, of enjoying such and such a portion of good.”11 The principle of security 
implies, amongst other things, that if the system of law and legal entitlements is ever 
changed, then such change should be applied only to future determinations of 
entitlement and not retrospectively to existing entitlements. Otherwise, somebody 
who had a legitimate expectation of x based on a legal entitlement to x would have the 
rug pulled from under him. 
 Looking beyond Bentham for a moment, the general idea behind this first account 
of the legitimacy of expectations is this. Expectations need to be underpinned by laws 
in order for agents to possess, not merely a belief that something will or will not 
happen in the future (such as their keeping their property or others not taking their 
property from them) and not merely an expectation in the prescriptive sense (that they 
                                                 
8Jeremy Bentham, Supply Without Burden, in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 2, ed. John Bowring 
(Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843), p. 589. 
9Jeremy Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code, in Jeremy Bentham, The Theory of Legislation, ed. C. 
K. Ogden (London: Keagan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1931), p. 113. 
10Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code, p. 111. 
11Ibid., p. 113. 
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ought to keep their property), but also a sense that their prescriptive expectation is 
warranted, such that the rest of society could recognise it as being in some way 
justified. That they have a legal entitlement to the property in itself provides one such 
warrant.12 
 But one problem with this account is that it privileges the fact that an expectation 
can be based on a system of law and legal entitlements above other things that 
expectations can be based on. Not least among them are social customs, habits, or 
conventions. Returning to Bentham, it is certainly true that when it comes to property 
Bentham often emphasises the role of expectations based on law, especially in 
Principles of the Civil Code.13 Yet even he recognised the need for policymakers to 
heed “grounds of expectation previous to any act of law,” most pointedly in 
circumstances where new laws or legal institutions are being created or old ones being 
changed, reformed, or superseded.14 Here the question becomes what sort of principle 
should guide the actions of legislators and judges tasked with deciding whether or not 
to legally recognise expectations which are based on social customs or only partially 
legalised customs. The security principle is useless for this task because it merely 
enjoins respect for expectations that are already based on law and determined legal 
entitlements. Interestingly, Bentham does have a principle in mind, one that highlights 
the diseuphoria which attends the frustration of even customary expectations. He 
points out that for any expectation based on a custom, such as a custom of treating 
property x as belonging to agent A, there are two parties: those who stand to benefit 
from the expectation being legitimised, that is, having the custom recognised in law 
and legal entitlements determined accordingly, and those who stand to lose from the 
expectation being legitimised.15 If the customary expectation is not legitimised, the 
first party would suffer “the pain of disappointment,” a sense of displeasure at having 
the customary expectation disappointed. By contrast, if the customary expectation is 
not legitimised, the second party would enjoy a type of access to the property which 
he did not expect given the custom. But when it comes to balancing these interests on 
                                                 
12See also Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988); 
“Superseding historic injustice,” Ethics, 103 (1992), 4–28; and The Rule of Law and the Measure 
of Property (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), esp. pp. 53–4. Cf. Margaret Moore, 
A Political Theory of Territory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
13See, e.g., Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code, p. 112. 
14See Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries, in The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham: 
A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, ed. J. H. Burns and H. L. A. 
Hart (London: The Athlone Press, 1977), p. 231. 
15Ibid., pp. 230–3. 
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the scales of utility, Bentham assigns extra weight to minimising the pain of 
disappointment.16 Indeed, in a number of his writings relating to property Bentham 
defends what he variously dubs “the disappointment-preventive principle,” “the non-
disappointment principle,” or “the disappointment-minimizing principle”—a principle 
which calls on those responsible for creating new, or making changes to existing, laws 
and legal institutions to minimise the disappointment of individuals’ expectations, 
including individuals’ expectations of certain items of property that are based on their 
already being in possession of those items and the underlying social custom (pre-legal 
or only partially legalised) of respecting the fact that individuals are in possession of 
certain items of property by not attempting to seize those items from them.17 
 So when confronted with the Law-Based Account one wonders why expectations 
are only legitimate if they are based on a system of law or set of formalised and 
coercively enforced public rules. Could not they also be legitimate if they are based 
on social customs or a set of informal public habits or conventions? Could not the fact 
that an individual’s prescriptive expectation of keeping x is based on a social custom 
(pre-legal) that individuals in possession of x get to keep x also make the relevant 
expectation warranted in one sense? 
 Of course, if one recognises as legitimate, expectations based on social customs, 
along with expectations based on laws, then one is also opening up the possibility of 
conflicts between the different kinds of expectations. Perhaps defenders of the Law-
Based Account would argue that in such instances the expectations based on law 
would always trump those based on social customs, and this reveals something about 
the nature of true legitimacy. But then there may be instances when it is a good thing 
to uphold expectations based on customs over expectations based on law—such as if 
there has been a customary practice not to try to remove people living on disused, 
derelict, or unused land, and individuals have relied on their customary expectations 
                                                 
16 Ibid. Bentham also provides some concrete illustrations of how courts should decide cases involving 
customary expectations in accordance with the disappointment-preventive principle. Ibid., pp. 
242–6. 
17See Jeremy Bentham, Equity Dispatch Court Proposal [1830], in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 
3, ed. John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843), p. 312; Equity Dispatch Court Bill [1830], 
in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 3, ed. John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843), p. 
388; A Commentary on Mr. Humphrey’s Real Property Code [1826], in The Works of Jeremy 
Bentham, vol. 5, ed. John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843), pp. 413–4; Outline of a Plan 
of a General Register of Real Property [1828], in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 5, ed. John 
Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843), p. 419; Lord Bougham Displayed [1832], in The 
Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 5, ed. John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843), pp. 564, 
587. 
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to plan and build homes, family life, or even small communities, even when the 
rightful landowners suddenly decide to enforce their legal entitlements. Perhaps one 
solution to this problem would be to only recognise as legitimate, expectations that 
are based on law, whilst at the same time highlighting the fact that these laws 
themselves reflect and are situated in a social milieu that includes customs, a fact that 
is not lost on the holders of such expectations.18 
 Nevertheless, the more fundamental problem for the Law-Based Account is its 
failure—or inability?—to explain or motivate what it is about expectations based on 
laws that makes the relevant beliefs and prescriptive claims about the future 
warranted—some deeper, morally relevant quality which expectations based on other 
things may clearly lack, aside from the brute fact that they are not based on laws. 
 The second account of legitimate expectations can be motivated with a line of 
questioning that tries to get at one such potential quality. Even if we assume that an 
expectation is based on a system of law and legal entitlements, what if that system is 
itself unjust? What if expectations of private property are based on a regime of private 
property which is unjust? Or, what if expectations of income are based on lawful 
economic institutions which are nevertheless unjust? Surely this has implications for 
the epistemic justification or warrant with which an agent holds certain expectations, 
prescriptive as well as predictive, based on sound or credible beliefs, including 
normative beliefs. Accordingly, it is tempting to think that simply having a basis in 
law (or social custom) is not sufficient to bestow legitimacy upon expectations, and 
that instead the legitimacy of expectations depends crucially on matters of justice. In 
other words, the legitimacy of expectations supervenes on the substantive justice of 
the expectations and/or on the justice of the scheme of rules and institutions (“basic 
structure”) from which they flow. 
 This second account has been identified with the work of Rawls, who discusses 
the concept of legitimate expectations in the context of expounding his ideal theory of 
justice for the basic structure of society. But this account is certainly not exhausted 
by, and perhaps not even exemplified in, the work of Rawls, once non-ideal 
conditions enter into the picture. Rawls argues that citizens will need to know at any 
given time what properly belongs to them and what is due to them. According to 
                                                 
18This seems to be what Bailey H. Kuklin has in mind with his conception of “reasonable 
expectations.” See his “The plausibility of legally protecting reasonable expectations,” 
Valparaiso University Law Review, 32 (1997), 19–66, at pp. 23–9; and “The justification for 
protecting reasonable expectations,” Hofstra Law Review, 29 (2001), 863–905, at pp. 866–7. 
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Rawls, “such entitlements are … very often derived from social institutions and the 
legitimate expectations to which they give rise.”19 In other words, “as persons and 
groups take part in just arrangements, they acquire claims on one another defined by 
publicly recognized rules. … [S]o a person who has complied with the scheme and 
done his share has a right to be treated accordingly by others. They are bound to meet 
his legitimate expectations.”20  
The implication here is that under ideal conditions the legitimacy of 
expectations supervenes on the justice of the social institutions that give rise to them. 
Yet Rawls’s brief comments on legitimate expectations focus, like his theory in 
general, on ideal theory, so he does not explicitly say whether or not expectations 
which exist under an unjust regime can qualify as legitimate. Rawls claims that if 
expectations exist against the backdrop of a just basic structure, then they are 
legitimate; he does not explicitly claim that expectations are legitimate only if they 
exist against the backdrop of a just basic structure. But Allen Buchanan, at least, reads 
Rawls as intending not merely the sufficient condition but also the necessary 
condition, meaning that if the basic structure is unjust then the expectations cannot be 
legitimate: “the rules of the basic structure determine the legitimacy of individuals’ 
expectations.”21  
In effect, Buchanan is presenting a non-ideal theory-based version of Rawls’s 
ideal theory-based account of legitimate expectations. One implication of Buchanan’s 
version is that if just institutions go from being just to being unjust, then the 
expectations formed under the just institutions must change from being legitimate to 
being illegitimate. Or, as Buchanan puts it, “as previously just Rawlsian basic 
structures become unjust instantaneously in the light of new information about how to 
maximize the benefit of the worst off, so previously legitimate Rawlsian expectations 
lose their legitimacy just as instantaneously.”22  
However, it might be countered that Buchanan has no grounds on which to 
describe the non-ideal theory-based version of Rawls’s account that he has presented 
as Rawls’ account. For Rawls, justice enters into our judgment about the legitimacy of 
expectations in ideal theory. Thus we cannot presume to know what Rawls would say 
                                                 
19John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 10. 
20Ibid., pp. 311, 313. 
21Allen Buchanan, “Distributive justice and legitimate expectations,” Philosophical Studies, 28 (1975), 
419–25, at p. 421. 
22Ibid. 
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on the question of where justice enters into our judgment about the legitimacy of 
expectations in non-ideal theory. We are not entitled to say, for example that, for 
Rawls, in an unjust scheme a person could never have legitimate expectations of 
others.  
Whilst I think this response must be taken seriously, it might nevertheless be 
worthwhile exploring Buchanan’s non-ideal theory-based version of Rawls’s ideal 
theory-based account of legitimate expectations, and critically evaluating his 
objection to that version.23 The version still merits serious consideration even if it is 
more accurately attributed to Buchanan’s imagination than to Rawls. After all, it is 
not as though Rawls thinks that issues of justice are irrelevant or immaterial in non-
ideal conditions. On the contrary, Rawls explicitly states that “[i]n these cases the 
problem is to discover the just way to meet certain given limitations.”24 Indeed, in the 
context of discussing non-ideal theory in relation to the Law of Peoples, Rawls states 
that non-ideal theory has an important role to play because it “looks for policies and 
courses of action that are morally permissible and politically possible as well as likely 
to be effective.”25 If non-ideal theorising about justice within well-ordered societies is 
important for similar reasons, then Buchanan’s non-ideal theory-based version ought 
to be assessed. Furthermore, given that Rawls did place great value on people’s 
capacity to frame and execute long-term plans, it does not seem outlandish to think 
that if, contrary to fact, Rawls had opted to develop a non-ideal theory-based account 
of just and morally permissible institutional change, he would have had something to 
say about the need to safeguard this capacity. 
Putting Rawls’s theory of justice to one side, however, it is not difficult to 
imagine a more general theory or family of theories of legitimate expectations which 
appeals to justice in a broader sense of that concept. According to this family of 
theories, if an expectation is just it is legitimate, but if it is unjust it is illegitimate. 
Meyer and Sanklecha dub these “justice-based theories.”26 They also point out that 
the relevant form of justice could be the substantive justice of the expectation (the 
justice of what the expectation is for) as well as the justice of the basic structure (the 
justice of the background from which the expectation emerged). One major drawback 
                                                 
23As in fact I did in Alexander Brown, “Rawls, Buchanan, and the legal doctrine of legitimate 
expectations,” Social Theory and Practice, 38 (2012), 617−44.  
24Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 244. 
25John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Harvard, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 89. 
26Meyer and Sanklecha, “How legitimate expectations matter in climate justice.” 
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with this simplified Justice-Based Account of the legitimacy of expectations, 
however, is that if it turns out to be true that the basic structure is and has always been 
unjust, then no actual expectations can be deemed legitimate by dint of the justice of 
the basic structure, and if it also turns out to be true that very few expectations are 
substantively just, then very few actual expectations can be deemed legitimate in 
virtue of their being substantively just. So, at first glance, the simplified Justice-Based 
Account appears to have limited application for non-ideal conditions, unless, that is, it 
“could be modified by attempting to make space for degrees of justice.”27 
 For their part, Meyer and Sanklecha argue that the legitimacy of expectations 
supervenes not on the justice of the basic structure but instead on the legitimacy of the 
governing agencies and political authorities in charge of the scheme of rules and 
institutions, and on the legitimacy of the particular laws and adjudications made by 
those governing agencies and political authorities. As Meyer and Sanklecha put it, 
“instead of requiring the perfect justice of background institutions, we should instead 
focus on their legitimacy.”28 According to the Legitimate Authority-Based Account, 
“if [state] coercion is justified, then the citizens of that state are correspondingly 
justified in forming expectations based on the legitimate actions of the state.”29 In 
other words, if agents form expectations about what the state will do in exercising its 
coercive power, and if that exercise of coercive power is legitimate, then the 
expectations are legitimate. This means, therefore, that legitimate governing agencies 
and political authorities may make legitimate changes to existing laws and thereby 
frustrate, with impunity, expectations that agents formed concerning the future 
continuation of those laws. In so doing they make the extant expectations in one sense 
no longer legitimate. So, for example, a government may introduce new laws on the 
maximum carbon emissions of citizens, and thereby frustrate the expectations of those 
citizens that they will be able to continue to emit their current level of carbon 
emissions in the future, but this will not amount to frustrating legitimate expectations 
(since these expectations are no longer legitimate); provided, that is, that the 
government is not illegitimate and that the new laws are themselves not illegitimate or 
illegitimately made or render the government as a whole illegitimate.30   
                                                 
27Ibid., p. 378. 
28Ibid., p. 375. 
29Ibid. 
30Meyer and Sanklecha, “Individual expectations and climate justice,” pp. 454–6. 
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Conversely, even if a governmental administrative agency creates an expectation 
on the part of a non-governmental agent that it will do (or not do) something in the 
future, such as that it will keep or change some policy or make some particular 
decision or adjudication, this will not suffice to make the expectation legitimate. For 
example, if that governmental administrative agency acted ultra vires (beyond the 
scope of its legal authority), then, on the Legitimate Authority-Based Account, the 
expectation it creates cannot be legitimate.31 This can happen in two ways: first, if the 
governmental administrative agency, including a particular official, lacks the legal 
authority to create expectations about what its policy, decision, or adjudication will be 
in the future; and second, if it lacks the legal authority to make the very policy, 
decision, or adjudication concerning which it has created the expectation.32 The 
principle that ultra vires expectations (in either of the above senses) cannot be 
legitimate is embraced in English administrative law,33 Irish administrative law,34 and 
European Community law,35 for example. (Note, however, that the position in other 
countries, the Netherlands, for example, is different; here expectations can be 
recognised as legitimate by administrative courts even if they involve governmental 
administrative agencies acting ultra vires.36 What is more, even in England, the 
Health Service Commissioner (HSC) (otherwise known as the Health Service 
Ombudsman) has, in some cases, recognised at least the moral standing of 
expectations that were “incorrectly” raised—expectations about the funding of 
                                                 
31See, e.g., Paul Reynolds, “Legitimate expectations and the protection of trust in public officials,” 
Public Law (2011), 330–52, at p. 334n.84. 
32Craig, Administrative Law, pp. 694–8. 
33 See, e.g., R v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Ex parte Hamble (Offshore) Fisheries Ltd 
[1995] 2 All ER 714, at [48]; R. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex parte MFK Underwriting 
Agents Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 1545, at 1573; R. (Bibi) v. Newham LBC [2002] 1 WLR 237, at [46]. 
For a more detailed overview and analysis of the English case law on this issue, see Craig, 
Administrative Law, pp. 694–702; Paul Daly, “A pluralist account of deference and legitimate 
expectations,” in M. Groves and G. Weeks eds., Legitimate Expectations in the Common Law 
World (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), pp. 101–20, at pp. 118–20. 
34See, e.g., Wiley v. The Revenue Commissioners [1994] 2 IR 160, at 166–7. 
35See, e.g., Forvass v Commission [1999] ECR 705, at [70]. See also Robert Thomas, Legitimate 
Expectations and Proportionality in Administrative Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000), p. 57.  
36C. J. Bax, “Judicial control of the administration in the Netherlands,” European Review of Public 
Law, 71 (1992), 71−81, at pp. 76–7; Rob Widdershoven and Roel de Lange, “Dutch report,” in J. 
Schwarze (ed.), Administrative Law Under European Influence: On the Convergence of the 
Administrative Laws of the EU Member States (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1996), pp. 550–99, 
at pp. 569–70; Thomas, Legitimate Expectations and Proportionality, pp. 56–7.  
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medical treatment for conditions that the relevant authorities were within their rights 
to refuse to fund on the basis of a policy of not funding cosmetic conditions.37) 
 In the next section I present and defend a rival account; or, at least, a rival account 
of legitimate expectations for public administration. 
 
 
II. A NEW RESPONSIBILITY-BASED ACCOUNT 
 
The previous accounts locate the legitimacy of expectations in the presence of laws 
which ground expectations (the Law-Based Account), in the substantive justice of 
expectations or in the justice of the basic structure which forms the background to 
expectations (the Justice-Based Account), or in the legitimacy of the governing 
agencies and political authorities whose acts and omissions are the subject of 
expectations (the Legitimate Authority-Based Account). By contrast, my proposed 
new account, the Responsibility-Based Account, focuses on the normatively salient 
issue of whether or not governmental administrative agencies are were responsible for 
creating the expectations after they had been given or had assumed a role 
responsibility, competence, or discretion over the relevant policies and measures. 
The Law-Based Account, Justice-Based Account, and Legitimate Authority-
Based Account each offer necessary and sufficient conditions under which 
expectations are legitimate. Provided that agents possess expectations and these 
expectations are based on laws, exist against the background of a just basic structure, 
or concern the legitimate actions of legitimate governing agencies and political 
authorities, then this is sufficient to render these expectations legitimate. On these 
other accounts, then, it is not crucial per se that governmental administrative agents or 
agencies are responsible for creating expectations. So, even if it turned out that such 
an agent or agency was not really responsible for creating the relevant expectations, 
those expectations would nevertheless be legitimate provided that the aforementioned 
necessary conditions were met.  
On my proposed account, by contrast, the responsibility of governmental 
administrative agents or agencies for creating expectations does matter, and it matters 
                                                 
37London North West Healthcare NHS Trust, PHSO, December 2015. Report on Selected Summaries of 
Investigations by the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman: October to December 
2015, Summary 1202, at pp. 141–2. 
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decisively. In other words, expectations about what governmental administrative 
agents or agencies will do or not do in the future are legitimate if, and only if, those 
agents or agencies were responsible for creating the expectations after they had been 
given or had assumed a role responsibility, competence, or discretion over the 
relevant policies and measures. If these conditions are met, then the expectations are 
legitimate even if they are not based on laws, are not substantively just or do not exist 
against the background of a just basic structure, and are not based on or do not 
concern the legitimate (intra vires) actions of legitimate governing agencies and 
political authorities.  
 Interestingly, defenders of existing accounts of the legitimacy of expectations 
have at times hinted that they might also endorse the Responsibility-Based Account. 
In his Principles of the Civil Code, for example, Bentham writes of a lawful 
expectation of property that “[t]he legislator owes the greatest respect to this 
expectation which he has himself produced.”38 Similarly, at one point Meyer and 
Sanklecha state that “[t]he intuitive plausibility of the [legitimate authority-based] 
theory rests on the claim that the state plays a significant, perhaps even determining, 
role in the formation of Phi’s emission expectations.”39 Superficially, then, it might 
appear as though the Responsibility-Based Account is merely a complementary 
account as opposed to a rival account: that it is simply stating the further conditions 
that must be met in order for expectations to be fully legitimate, provided that they 
have also been formed in relation to laws, a just basic structure, or a legitimate 
authority. In reality, however, the Responsibility-Based Account is not simply 
augmenting or merely stating more precisely conditions which are already implicit in 
the Law-Based Account, Justice-Based Account, and Legitimate Authority-Based 
Account. Instead, it is stating a different set of necessary and sufficient conditions that 
lead in different directions to the existing accounts. I believe that when push comes to 
shove neither Bentham nor Meyer and Sanklecha would endorse the Responsibility-
Based Account. Thus, according to this account, an expectation can be legitimate 
even if it is not based on a law or legal entitlement, just as long as the governmental 
administrative agent or agency was responsible for bringing about the expectation 
after it had been given or had assumed a role responsibility, competence, or discretion 
over the relevant policies and measures. For example, the agent or agency might 
                                                 
38Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code, p. 113. 
39Meyer and Sanklecha, “How legitimate expectations matter in climate justice,” p. 375. 
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provide an assurance of some future decision or adjudication which is simply a matter 
of administrative discretion.  
Conversely, according to the Responsibility-Based Account, even when an 
expectation is grounded on a law or legal entitlement this does not necessarily mean 
that the governmental authority that promulgated the law is responsible for creating 
the expectation or, therefore, that the expectation is necessarily legitimate. For 
example, a government might have taken reasonable steps to warn agents that the law 
is subject to change such that if agents continue to expect the law to remain 
unchanged, this is not really the responsibility of the government. Bentham does not 
appear to endorse these views. Moreover, according to the Responsibility-Based 
Account, an expectation can be legitimate even if it concerns the illegitimate (ultra 
vires) acts or omissions of an illegitimate governmental administrative agent or 
agency, just as long as the agent or agency was responsible for creating the 
expectation after it had been given or had assumed a role responsibility, competence 
or discretion over the relevant policies and measures.40 
 Finally, just because an expectation concerns the legitimate (intra vires) acts or 
omissions of a legitimate governmental agent or agency, this does not automatically 
mean that the agent or agency was in fact responsible for creating the expectation and, 
therefore, this does not automatically mean that the expectation is legitimate. Putting 
all this another way, whilst Bentham had insight in pointing out that “[t]he legislator 
owes the greatest respect to this expectation which he has himself produced,”41 a 
proper insistence on the centrality of the issue of whether or not governmental 
administrative agents or agencies are responsible for creating expectations leads to a 
different development of these insights vis-à-vis the core question of the legitimacy of 
expectations. 
 The starting point for the new account I am proposing is recognising what is and 
what is not truly significant about an agent’s expectation when it is legitimate. The 
basis of the agent being epistemically justified or warranted in holding the expectation 
(predictive and prescriptive) is not some conduct on the part of the aggrieved agent 
(e.g., entering into a contract with the decision-maker). Nor is it some substantive 
interest in x held by the aggrieved agent that exists independently of the legitimate 
                                                 
40Contrary to Meyer and Sanklecha. 
41Meyer and Sanklecha likewise make it clear that “the state plays a significant, perhaps even 
determining, role in the formation of [expectations].” 
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expectation (for example, an essential human interest in x). Rather, as Elias explains, 
“[it is the] legitimate expectation arising out of the conduct of the decision-maker 
which provides the basis of the protection.”42 Or, in the words of Reynolds, “the 
doctrine is able to intervene (and, properly understood, only intervenes) where 
interests have crystallised into protectable rights by virtue of some action of the 
decision-maker.”43 At the heart of my theory is the idea that the defining mode of 
conduct on the part of governmental administrative agents or agencies in legitimate 
expectations cases is that they were responsible for creating expectations after they 
had been given or had assumed a role responsibility, competence, or discretion over 
the relevant policies and measures. Putting this in terms of the hallmarks of the 
general concept legitimate expectations (as opposed to the legal doctrine), we can say 
that the basis of the agent being epistemically justified or warranted in holding the 
expectation (predictive and prescriptive) is the agent’s normative belief that a 
governmental administrative agency was responsible for bringing about the agent’s 
expectation after the agency had been given or had assumed a role responsibility, 
competence, or discretion over the relevant policies and measures. 
 What, then, are some of the ways in which such agents or agencies can be 
responsible for creating expectations on the part of non-governmental agents? In 
answering this question I shall focus exclusively on public administration, that is, the 
implementation of the government’s policy agenda by administrative agents and 
agencies via administrative policies (secondary legislation, general rules, regulations, 
and policy statements) and administrative measures (administrative orders, decisions, 
and adjudications in particular cases). I shall also hone in on expectations that are held 
by non-governmental agents, which I take to include individual citizens, groups, 
businesses, organisations, institutions, and instrumentalities (for example, schools). 
 So with public administration in mind, consider now several different ways in 
which administrative agencies of government can be responsible for creating 
expectations, which are in turn, on my account, legitimate expectations in virtue of 
that responsibility. By offering several modes, as opposed to two or even one, I am 
consciously stepping outside of the narrow constraints of the doctrine of legitimate 
                                                 
42P. Elias, “Legitimate expectation and judicial review,” in J. Jowell and D. Oliver eds., New Directions 
in Judicial Review (London: Stevens, 1988), pp. 37–50, at p. 41. 
43Reynolds, “Legitimate expectations and the protection of trust on public officials,” p. 334. 
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expectations as it occurs in English administrative law, for example.44 My aim here is 
to flesh out a more generalised, less doctrinally-specific description of how legitimate 
expectations may come about, and ultimately to develop a new, more plausible and 
comprehensive account of what it is that lends legitimacy to legitimate expectations. 
Nevertheless, the different ways are intended to be merely illustrative, rather than 
exhaustive, of how governmental agencies of government can be responsible for 
creating expectations on the part of non-governmental agents. Conceivably there may 
be other ways that also fall under the rubric of responsibility. 
 
(1) Expectations which are inadvertently caused by governmental administrative 
agents or agencies.  
 
(i) Governmental administrative agent or agency G has been given or has 
assumed a role responsibility, competence, or discretion for making decisions 
over certain issues which affect the important interests of non-governmental agent 
A, something of which both G and A are fully aware.  
(ii) G is also responsible for A coming to believe or predict that G will x (where x 
is a procedural action/omission) by virtue of G inadvertently causing A to believe 
or predict that G will x.  
Depending on the circumstances of the case, that G has inadvertently 
caused A to believe or predict that G will x could be due simply to: (a) G in 
the past permitting A to receive some advantage, benefit, or other outcome.  
In virtue of (i) and (ii)(a), G has thereby also created a legitimate expectation on 
the part of A that G will x, meaning A expects, in the prescriptive sense, G to x, 
and it is justifiable for A to expect, in the prescriptive sense, G to x. 
 
(2) Expectations which are negligently caused by governmental administrative agents 
or agencies.  
 
(i) Governmental administrative agent or agency G has been given or has 
assumed a role responsibility, competence, or discretion for making decisions 
                                                 
44Traditionally administrative courts in England have applied the doctrine of legitimate expectations, 
first, to circumstances in which an expectation (procedural or substantive) is based upon past 
provision of an advantage or benefit, and second, to circumstances in which an expectation 
(procedural or substantive) is based upon an assurance or promise. 
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over certain issues which affect the important interests of non-governmental 
agent A, something of which both G and A are fully aware.  
(iii) G is also responsible for A coming to believe or predict that G will x (where x 
could be a procedural or a substantive action/omission) in virtue of G negligently 
causing A to believe or predict that G will x.  
Depending on the circumstances of the case, that G has negligently caused 
A to believe or predict that G will x could be due to: (b) G in the past 
permitting A to receive some advantage, benefit, or other outcome, and by 
G knowing that this past practice is set to change, but nevertheless failing to 
take reasonable steps to warn A personally, and in a timely fashion, that this 
past practice is set to change, or G failing to take reasonable steps to warn A 
that its past practice is an unreliable guide to what it will do or not do in the 
future; or (c) G doing the same as described in (b) plus relying on third 
parties to warn A of the aforementioned, but not doing enough to reinforce 
those warnings itself, such as by signposting, confirming, or reiterating the 
advice given by third parties.  
In virtue of (i) and (iii)(b)/(c), G has thereby also created a legitimate expectation 
on the part of A that G will x, meaning A expects, in the prescriptive sense, G to x, 
and it is justifiable for A to expect, in the prescriptive sense, G to x. 
 
(3) Expectations which are intentionally caused by governmental administrative 
agents or agencies.  
 
(i) Governmental administrative agent or agency G has been given or has 
assumed a role responsibility, competence, or discretion for making decisions 
over certain issues which affect the important interests of non-governmental agent 
A, something of which both G and A are fully aware.  
(iv) G is also responsible for A coming to believe or predict that G will x (where x 
could be a procedural or a substantive action/omission) by virtue of G 
intentionally causing A to believe or predict that G will x.  
Depending on the circumstances of the case, that G has intentionally caused 
A to believe or predict that G will x could be due to: (d) G making it known 
there is a public interest that G will x or making it known that a state of 
affairs which is normally sufficient for G to x obtains, with the intention of 
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causing A to believe or predict that G will x; (e) G requiring A to make a 
declaration that G knows is thereby likely to make A believe G will x, with 
the intention of causing A to believe or predict that G will x; (f) G providing 
A with an assurance that G is minded to x, with the intention of causing A to 
believe or predict that G will x; or (g) G providing A with a commitment, 
undertaking, or promise that G will x, with the intention of causing A to 
believe or predict that G will x. 
In virtue of (i) and (iv)(d)/(e)/(f)/(g), G has thereby also created a legitimate 
expectation on the part of A that G will x, meaning A expects, in the prescriptive 
sense, G to x, and it is justifiable for A to expect, in the prescriptive sense, G to x. 
 
 I need to make three things clear about these modes of creating legitimate 
expectations. The first is that, as a whole, (1)–(3) do not assume some background 
theory of promissory obligations and rights or theory of contractual obligations and 
rights; which is to say, I am not suggesting that any moral obligations and rights 
arising from the creation of legitimate expectations are species of promissory 
obligations and rights or species of contractual obligations and rights, concerning 
which I owe some background theory.45 On the contrary, I take it that legitimate 
expectations, and any moral obligations and rights as well as any legal effects or relief 
to which they give rise, are sui generis.  
Although mode (3)(iv)(g) does involve G providing A with a commitment, 
undertaking, or promise that G will x, the legitimate expectation created is more than, 
and is not reducible to, a mere promissory right alone. It also includes (i) and (iv), as 
well as the fact that A expects G to x, in the prescriptive sense, and the fact that A’s 
expectation is justifiable. Moreover, it should be noted that (3)(iv)(g) does not 
                                                 
45For more on the nature of, and similarities and differences between, promissory and contractual 
obligations and rights, see, e.g., Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1990); T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1998), ch. 7; T. M. Scanlon, “Promises and contracts,” in P. Benson 
ed., The Theory of Contract Law: New Essays (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), pp. 86–117; Margaret Gilbert, “Three dogmas about promising,” in H. Sheinman ed., 
Promises and Agreements: Philosophical Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 
80–108; and David Owens, Shaping the Normative Landscape (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), ch. 5. 
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necessarily involve the sort of “joint commitment” that some theorists identify with 
promissory obligations.46  
Likewise, it is entirely feasible that none of the modes of creating legitimate 
expectations (1)–(3) rise to the level of making a contract, meaning that it is quite 
possible that in none of these modes is it the case that G has made a contract with A, 
or even an implied contract. Even if one thinks that all contracts involve promises,47 it 
does not follow that all promises are contracts. On the contrary, a contract must 
contain mutual promises, promises travelling in both directions. Notice that in mode 
(3)(iv)(g) the promise is only in one direction. Now in response it might be suggested 
that in real life examples of legitimate expectations, there are implied promises on the 
part of the agent. Thus, suppose agent A is involved in delivering services to the 
public and that when a governmental administrative agency G causes agent A to 
believe or predict that G will x (e.g., grant funding to A) by providing agent A with a 
written or verbal commitment, undertaking, or promise that G will x, G does so not in 
a vacuum but partly on the basis that A has also made a promise to use the money for 
the intended purposes, to act lawfully, to deliver value for money, to achieve adequate 
quality levels, to maintain appropriate governance, and so forth. In this event there is 
a reciprocal promise and, therefore, we could be in the terrain of an implied contract. 
However, although I am not denying that some instances of legitimate expectations 
can also be instances of reciprocal promises and implied contracts, what I am 
suggesting is that it is quite possible for governmental administrative agents or 
agencies to create legitimate expectations even in the absence of reciprocal promises 
and implied contracts. So I think we can also imagine a situation in which 
governmental administrative agent or agency G causes agent A to believe or predict 
that G will x by promising A that G will x in the absence of A making any reciprocal 
promise, and in the absence of making an implied contract.48 
 Second, the legitimate expectations created under modes (1)–(3) all possess the 
three hallmarks of legitimate expectations, as a general concept. For one thing, each 
mode involves an agent A that comes to “believe or predict that G will x.” The beliefs 
                                                 
46See Margaret Gilbert, Joint Commitment, How We Make Our Social World (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013). 
47See, e.g., Charles Fried, Contract as Promise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981). 
48For an account of non-contractual liability for frustrated legitimate expectations in EU law, for 
instance, see Constantin Stefanou and Helen Xanthaki, A Legal and Political Interpretation of 
Article 215(2) [New Article 288(2)] of the Treaty of Rome: The Individual Strikes Back 
(Dartmouth: Ashgate, 2000). 
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or predictions outlined in (1)–(3) can be simple beliefs that G will x, but they can also 
be more complicated probabilistic predictions that G will x, signifying that A predicts 
that G will x with n degree of probability. Either way, they are expectations about the 
future.  
Moreover, the relevant expectations are also prescriptive: they involve not merely 
A believing or predicting that G will x, but also A holding that G should x. In addition, 
each of these three modes involves prescriptive expectations that are not baseless but 
are instead justifiable, in the sense that there is some epistemic justification or warrant 
for A expecting that G should x. This justification is based on agent A’s sound or 
credible belief that G was in some way responsible for bringing about A’s expectation. 
Together these descriptions and conditions play a crucial role in ensuring that (1)–(3) 
are in fact modes of creating legitimate expectations as opposed to ways of creating 
states of affair that are legitimate but not expectations, or states of affair that are 
expectations but not legitimate. 
 The third thing I need to make clear is that I use the phrase “in virtue of” in order 
to underscore the fact that the grounds or bases for saying that legitimate expectations 
have been created are contained in the preceding descriptions and conditions. In other 
words, what is supposed to explain why it is justifiable, or what is supposed to make it 
justifiable, for A to expect G to x, in the prescriptive sense, is specified in the 
descriptions of what is at stake, in what is believed or predicted, and in the contents of 
the conditions (i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) that come before the phrase “in virtue of.” 
 But what is it about the various descriptions and conditions set out in modes (1)–
(3) that render it justifiable for A to expect G to x in the prescriptive sense? What do 
they have common? I believe that one of the crucial elements here is the conduct of G 
or, to be more precise, G’s responsibility for bringing about A’s belief or prediction. I 
shall say more about the nature of this responsibility (and why it is not question 
begging) in section III. For now I simply want to make the claim that A’s epistemic 
justification or warrant for holding or affirming that G should x is partly A’s sound or 
credible belief that G was responsible for bringing about A’s belief or prediction that 
G will x. Putting this another way, if a governmental administrative agent or agency G 
is responsible, or can be credited (if that is the right word), for producing A’s beliefs 
or predictions that G will x, then it is more justifiable for A to hold that G should x 
than would otherwise be the case. In short, if G tried to claim that A has no basis on 
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which to affirm that G should x, A can reasonably say to G the following, “Since you 
led me to expect that you would x, you now really ought to x.” 
 However, I believe that a second shared element is necessary to make agents’ 
expectations truly justifiable: namely, the fact that governmental administrative agents 
or agencies had already either been given or assumed, in the sense of taking upon 
themselves, a role responsibility, competence, or discretion (administrative courts 
aside) for making binding decisions about issues that impinge on the interests of non-
governmental agents—decisions which are the subject matter of those agents’ 
expectations. Irrespective of whether or not governmental administrative agencies 
actually have legitimate authority on their side or are acting with legitimate authority, 
the brute fact that they have taken on this role responsibility means that non-
governmental agents have no real option but to rely on the conduct of governmental 
agencies qua decision-makers. Suppose agent A—a school—is forming a belief or 
prediction about public funding for a rebuilding project it aims to undertake, and a 
government agency G directly induces the expectation that funding will be 
forthcoming. It matters crucially, as far as the legitimacy of A’s expectation is 
concerned, that G has also taken on the role of primary decision-maker on public 
funding for school rebuilding projects like A’s. In short, A will need to take its lead 
about what to expect in terms of public funding from the indications and 
representations made by G. 
 On the proposed account, therefore, the relevant form of responsibility is two-
fold: first, being a governmental administrative agent or agency which has already 
been given or has assumed a role responsibility, competence, or discretion for making 
binding decisions about what will or will not happen in matters affecting non-
government agents’ important interests; second, being a governmental administrative 
agent or agency which has been responsible for creating expectations on the part non-
government agents. 
I call this the Responsibility-Based Account not to contrast it superficially with 
Law-Based Account, Justice-Based Account, and Legitimate Authority-Based 
Account, but because of its distinctive emphasis on the responsibility of governmental 
administrative agents or agencies. Because of this emphasis, it is no coincidence that 
none of the aforementioned modes of creating legitimate expectations involve an 
agent unilaterally developing beliefs or predictions about what governmental 
administrative agents or agencies will do or not do, that is, without any input from 
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those agencies. Quite the reverse, the expectations are to a large extent the outcomes 
of the acts and omissions of the governmental administrative agents or agencies. A 
legitimate expectation can never be based on a unilateral leap of faith made by the 
expectation holder. In the case of inadvertently caused beliefs or predictions, as 
described in (1)(ii)(a), these expectations come about in response to the past 
behaviour of the governmental administrative agency. In the case of negligently 
caused beliefs or predictions, in (2)(iii)(b)/(c), the beliefs or predictions are 
proximately caused by omission and negligence. Here the operative issue is whether 
G could or should know that A will develop the expectation and whether G has taken 
reasonable steps to prevent A from harbouring unreliable expectations. In the case of 
intentionally caused beliefs or predictions, in (3)(iv)(d)/(e)/(f)/(g), the beliefs or 
predictions are proximately caused by actions performed with the intention of 
producing these expectations. I shall say more about these different forms of 
responsibility in section III. 
 The idealised conditions set out in modes (1)–(3) provide, I think, one way of 
assessing the decisions of administrative courts—or a way of reinterpreting what the 
legal reasoning might have been had, contrary to fact, the judges operated with my 
theory in mind. Consider the European Union (ex European Community) law case 
Alessandro Accorinti and Others v. European Central Bank.49 Mr Accorinti and a 
group of Italian investors in Greek Government bonds (GGBs) had developed certain 
beliefs and predictions that GGBs would continue to be given a status of “adequate 
collateral” by the European Central Bank (ECB), thus enabling the GGBs to be used 
for access to Eurosystem liquidity operations by Greek banks. The General Court 
(EGC) found that the ECB had not created substantive legitimate expectations. 
Specifically, it found that the ECB had made only statements of a “general nature” 
about the situation in Greece and the GGBs and, more importantly, had made 
unequivocal statements that it lacked the power to control states of affair that would 
be conducive to the relevant beliefs or predictions turning out to be correct.50 I would 
reinterpret this judgement as the EGC in effect saying that ECB could not justifiably 
be deemed responsible for causing the relevant beliefs or predictions because the ECB 
                                                 
49Judgement of the General Court of the European Union (Fourth Chamber) of 7 October 2015, Case 
T-79/13. 
50Ibid., at [79]. 
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did in fact take reasonable steps to clarify that it was precisely not making the sorts of 
representations typical of mode (3). 
Or consider the local government ombudsman case Trafford Council.51 Here 
Trafford Council’s policy stated that direct payments could not normally be used to 
employ as a carer a relative living in the same household unless the council makes an 
exception if it believes this is necessary. Mrs C had been in receipt of direct payments 
for the care of Mr D for some time. In 2010 Mrs C emailed the council asking if she 
could employ her son, Mr E, as a carer for Mr D, even though Mr E was a relative 
living in the same household. The Council did not provide a clear answer. Mrs C from 
that point did use direct payments to pay Mr E to care for Mr D. The council knew by 
mid–2012 that the direct payments were partly being used to employ Mr E as a carer 
for Mr D. It took no action until mid–2013 when it gave Mrs C four weeks’ notice it 
would stop direct payments that funded Mr E’s employment. The Ombudsman 
concluded that by failing to act for a year to warn Mrs C that she was acting in 
contravention of the policy, both Mrs C and Mr E had a legitimate expectation that Mr 
E was being employed as a carer for Mr D.52 On the Responsibility-Based Account, 
the decision of the Ombudsman could be justified on the basis of finding that the 
Council had negligently caused the expectation by not having taken reasonable steps 
to warn Mrs C and Mr E that they were in contravention of the policy and could not 
reliably assume that they would be treated as an exception case, as per mode (2). 
 
 
III. A COMPLEX THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 
 
The theory of responsibility underpinning the Responsibility-Based Account is 
complex in the following ways. One aspect of responsibility pertains to whether or not 
a governmental administrative agent or agency has already been given or assumed, in 
the sense of taking upon itself, a role responsibility, competence, or discretion for 
making binding decisions over certain issues which affect the important interests of 
non-governmental agents. Of course, in one sense no governmental administrative 
agent or agency can be given or assume the mantle of making final decisions so long 
as their decisions are reviewable by administrative courts. But setting the rule of law 
                                                 
51No. 13 011 545 (LGO England, 18 January 2016). 
52Ibid., at [26]. 
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aside, the issue is whether the governmental administrative agent or agency has been 
given or simply adopted the posture of principal decision-maker with the power to 
make those decisions binding. If so, then the conduct of that agency in terms of 
creating expectations about what it will do or not do takes on a greater significance. 
By making this claim I am not appealing to the Legitimate Authority-Based 
Account. That a governmental administrative agency has been given or assumed a 
role responsibility, competence, or discretion for making binding decisions about 
issues that impinge on the important interests of non-governmental agents is separate 
from the issue of its doing so with or without legitimate authority. This separate issue 
concerns not only whether or not a governmental administrative agent or agency has 
acted or would be acting, on a particular occasion, intra vires (within its legal 
authority) or ultra vires (outside its legal authority),53 but also whether or not it, and 
the system of law and government of which it is a part, in general exhibits legitimate 
political authority (a justified right to rule).54 Even though “legitimate expectations” 
is a compound noun, in fact the semantics of this term are non-compositional. In other 
words, one does not come to properly understand what the term means simply by 
adding together the ordinary meanings of the terms “legitimate” and “expectations” as 
they occur in other areas of legal and political thought. 
In a modern state, more often than not, it will be a governmental administrative 
agent or agency that is given or assumes a role responsibility, competence, or 
discretion for making binding administrative decisions about the provision of public 
services, goods, and benefits. But where another body, such as a private organisation, 
does have something akin to this responsibility, then potentially it could also be 
appropriate to speak of legitimate expectations. Then again, such an appeal to 
legitimate expectations might be unnecessary or redundant if there are other legal 
                                                 
53For more on the doctrine of ultra vires as it relates to administrative law and legitimate expectations, 
see, e.g., Craig, Administrative Law, pp. 694–8. 
54For debate on the nature and sources of legitimate authority, see e.g., A. John Simmons, Moral 
Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); A. John 
Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001); Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1986); Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009); Leslie Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1988); Christopher W. Morris, An Essay on the Modern State (Cambidge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998); David Estlund, Democratic Authority (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2008); Arthur Isak Applbaum, “Legitimacy without the duty to obey,” 
Philosophy & Public Affairs, 38 (2010), 215–239; Merten Reglitz, “Political legitimacy without a 
(claim-) right to rule,” Res Publica 21 (2015), 291–307; Amanda Greene, “Consent and political 
legitimacy,” in D. Sobel et al. (eds.), Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), pp. 71–97.  
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doctrines that can be utilised by aggrieved agents, such as the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel in private law.55 
A second aspect of responsibility concerns the connection between the conduct of 
the governmental administrative agent or agency and the occurrence of the non-
governmental agent’s belief or prediction about what the former will do or not do. 
Here responsibility can be grounded in different ways. For one thing, responsibility 
might be based primarily in simple causation, including causation by omission, 
causation by action, and causation by a combination of omission and action. Under 
mode (1), for example, G might inadvertently cause A to believe or predict that G will 
institute a fair procedure prior to changing its policy simply by G permitting A to 
enjoy that policy for an extended period of time. A need only prove that A has the 
expectation and that G was responsible for the expectation in the sense that G caused 
it, even if G did not act negligently or with intention. Of course, even if it is not 
necessary to prove that G failed to take reasonable steps to disabuse A of the 
expectation or to prove that G intended to cause the expectation, it still might be 
necessary to show that G was conscious or aware that by permitting A to receive 
some advantage, benefit, or other outcome it was bringing about A’s expectation. So 
in that sense this responsibility might be primarily based on causation, but also 
includes some element of G being conscious or aware of doing the actions which 
caused the expectation, albeit inadvertently. Note that mode (1), unlike modes (2) and 
(3), only covers procedural expectations. This is because the brute fact of past 
practice is insufficient by itself to make a governmental administrative agency truly 
responsible for an agent coming to harbour a substantive expectation, in the absence 
of other conduct on the part of the agency that might justify such an attribution. 
Responsibility can also be grounded on negligence or intention depending on the 
circumstances of the case. Under mode (2), G might negligently cause A to believe or 
predict that G will provide some advantage, benefit, or other outcome by G in the past 
permitting A to enjoy that outcome, and by G’s failure to take reasonable steps to try 
to prevent A from forming this expectation, despite G knowing its unreliability. 
Negligence is reflected in the fact that as an administrative agency of government G 
has a duty of concern to agents to take reasonable steps to prevent them from 
harbouring unreliable expectations about what it will do or not do in the future, under 
                                                 
55For a discussion of the differences between the legal doctrines of legitimate expectations and 
estoppel, see Thomas, Legitimate Expectations and Proportionality, pp. 50–1. 
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circumstances when G knows that A’s expectation is unreliable (because G knows 
what is on the cards).  
This duty of concern might well be idiosyncratic to government. Ordinarily we 
cannot hold individual citizens, businesses, or non-governmental organisations 
responsible for causing expectations by omission. If they change their courses of 
action in ways that frustrate our expectations—because we expected them to behave 
in the future as they have done in the past—we cannot reasonably blame them for not 
warning us in advance that their behaviour is subject to change. But administrative 
agencies of government are not the same in that regard: they do have a duty of 
concern not to let us form expectations of future courses of action without taking 
reasonable steps to prevent us from forming what they know to be unreliable 
expectations. Thus, the substantive issue that will need to be decided by courts given 
the facts of particular cases is whether or not the governmental administrative agency 
has done enough to prevent agents from developing unreliable expectations, such as 
by issuing sufficient warnings. 
 Turning to mode (3), here responsibility is partly based on causation by actions, 
but also based on intention, reflected in the fact that G has intentionally set out to 
cause A to form a belief or prediction that G will x. Therefore, one substantive issue 
that will need to be addressed by courts given the facts of particular cases is whether 
or not the governmental administrative agency had indeed intended to cause the agent 
to believe or predict that the agency would x. Consider the English case R v. Secretary 
of State for Education and Employment, Ex parte Begbie.56 Here the court made much 
of the fact that some of the early representations made by the Secretary of State for 
Education on the matter of government policy regarding the assisted places scheme 
exhibited “mistake” and “incompetence” as opposed to revealing any “intention” to 
flag up a new policy whereby a certain category of children would keep their funded 
places beyond primary school age.57 In light of these sorts of judgements, it is surely 
not too far a stretch to ask courts, therefore, to enquire as to whether a governmental 
administrative agency had intended to cause the agent to believe or predict that the 
agency would x. One implication of applying an intention test is to ensure that 
administrative courts would not compel governmental administrative agencies to 
honour expectations that it was never their intention to create. Another implication is 
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that the test would prevent a non-governmental agent from attempting to exploit a 
situation in which it knew full well that a governmental administrative agency had not 
intended to create an expectation of some outcome or benefit, say, but nevertheless 
sought to take advantage of a representation given by mistake, due to ambiguity in 
wording or in some other unintentional way, in order to secure that outcome or 
benefit, either voluntarily from the agency or through substantive relief ordered by the 
court.58 
   
 
IV. THE LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS PRINCIPLE 
 
Let us now focus on circumstances where governmental administrative agents or 
agencies were responsible for creating legitimate expectations on the part of non-
governmental agents. How should they subsequently handle these expectations? 
According to the Legitimate Expectations Principle, any governmental administrative 
agents or agencies that were responsible for creating legitimate expectations on the 
part of non-governmental agents, or, indeed, other public bodies or even public 
employees, have a prima facie obligation to fulfil rather than frustrate those legitimate 
expectations. The Legitimate Expectations Principle not only reflects but also 
enshrines in a principle of administrative justice the hallmarks of legitimate 
expectations as both prescriptive and justifiable.  
Of course, governmental administrative agencies are not always able to honour 
the legitimate expectations they have previously created. Sometimes other areas of 
justice, sometimes the public interest (where distinct from justice), sometimes severe 
financial constraints, and sometimes harsh political realities dictate the frustration of 
legitimate expectations. In these scenarios we need to know what justice demands of 
government administrative agencies in how they handle the situation, that is, how they 
treat or what they owe to the agents concerned. Do they owe it to those agents to 
compensate any losses they suffer as a result of the frustrated expectation?59 Or do 
they owe them next-best remedies only? What form might these take? Could an 
appropriate remedy take the form of a good faith attempt to reduce or lessen to some 
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extent the detrimental effects of the frustrated expectation? Or could the remedy be a 
more imaginative, in kind benefit, such as giving them priority when it comes to the 
allocation of other public resources permissions or privileges in the gift of relevant 
administrative governmental agencies? Or should the remedy simply take the form of 
an official apology? Or maybe the duty of a governmental agency in this situation is 
limited to informing the agents concerned with all deliberate speed that their 
expectations are going to be frustrated, so that those agents have as much time as 
possible to adjust their plans and cut their losses?60 For the purposes of this article, 
however, I am setting aside these questions in order to focus on what makes 
expectations legitimate in the first place. 
I have characterised the Legitimate Expectations Principle as a principle of 
administrative justice. But it has often been said by administrative courts themselves 
(including in England) that dashing legitimate expectations is “unfair.” In Council of 
Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service,61 for example, Lord Roskill 
characterised the obligation to honour procedural legitimate expectations as being a 
“manifestation of the duty to act fairly.”62 (In other cases judges have turned to the 
phrase “so unfair as to be abuse of power” suggesting a conjoining of two standards, 
albeit without much guidance as to which is primary and which subsidiary.63) No 
doubt the Legitimate Expectations Principle can be justified by appeal to 
consequentialist as well as deontological considerations and values.64 But assuming 
for the sake of argument that the Principle embodies and can be justified by (albeit not 
exclusively) more general ideas of fairness, what are those ideas? 
 One possibility is that the moral point of the Legitimate Expectations Principle is 
to guard against governmental administrative agents or agencies letting down non-
governmental agents, where letting down is a more general family or kind of 
unfairness. Letting down can include the creation and subsequent failure to meet 
legitimate expectations, to disappoint in that sense, but it might also include not 
performing one’s responsibilities as one should, to fail to act with due diligence, for 
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instance, and it might also include simply withdrawing support, to forsake (with or 
without dashing expectations). Then again, what is the distinctive character of letting 
agents down as compared to other kinds of wrongs? In other words, is there some 
feature that all instances of letting agents down share in common? Or is this instead 
just a heterogeneous cluster of wrongs that do not in fact have any features or 
properties in common other than our propensity to refer to them with the phrase 
“letting people down”? Moreover, why is it unfair for governmental administrative 
agencies to let down non-governmental agents? Furthermore, if we already intuitively 
think that it is unfair for governmental administrative agencies to create and 
subsequently frustrate legitimate expectations on the part of non-governmental agents, 
what more does the idea of letting down add? 
Building on this line of questioning, my hunch (which I do not have space to 
explore fully here) is that if what is needed is a richer and deeper normative account 
of why it is unfair for governmental administrative agencies to create and 
subsequently frustrate legitimate expectations, then perhaps the Legitimate 
Expectations Principle could be understood instead as being derived from even more 
abstract or general standards governing relations between state and citizen—even 
more general, that is, than the duty not to let people down. This might include Rawls’s 
idea of principles of justice which citizens viewed as “moral agents” would accept in 
an initial position of equality and freedom as defining the fundamental terms of their 
cooperative association,65 or else Dworkin’s idea of citizens’ fundamental right to 
equal concern and respect. Or perhaps our account of fairness could reach more 
deeply still to some very basic principle of right conduct concerning human action in 
general. One obvious candidate might be Kant’s Categorical Imperative, that 
individuals are always to be treated not as means only but also as ends in themselves. 
 
 
V. LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS, JUSTICE, AND LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY 
 
I want to end by briefly clarifying my position on the relationship between legitimate 
expectations, justice, and legitimate authority. In terms of justice, I would argue that 
even an expectation that is justly frustrated may retain a residue of legitimacy in 
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virtue of the responsibility of the governmental administrative agent or agency in 
bringing about the relevant belief or prediction. Of course, governmental 
administrative agencies will often create and will sometimes frustrate legitimate 
expectations for the sake of other areas of justice, such as in the arrangement of 
economic inequalities, justice in the conditions of access to jobs, housing, transport, 
and services, and justice in the provision of basic liberties. But I see no reason to 
suppose that the legitimacy of these expectations must themselves supervene on or be 
determined by justice in these other areas of justice. 
However, by saying that justice in other areas does not determine the legitimacy 
of expectations I do not mean to imply that legitimate expectations do not raise issues 
of justice. On the contrary, I believe that the ways in which governmental 
administrative agencies handle legitimate expectations is in fact constitutive of one 
form of justice. Rawls has provided an account of the justice (under ideal conditions) 
presupposed by legitimate expectations. I am seeking to provide an account of justice 
in how governmental agencies handle the creation and then potential frustration of 
legitimate expectations (under non-ideal conditions). We may call this form of justice 
administrative justice to help distinguish it from social or distributive justice. 
In terms of legitimate authority, I would argue that even an expectation that is 
frustrated by a legitimate authority may retain a residue of legitimacy in virtue of the 
responsibility of the governmental administrative agent or agency in bringing about 
the relevant belief or prediction. Furthermore, I do not think that in order for an 
expectation to be legitimate at t2 it must be the case that the expectation was created 
by an agency acting intra vires and based on legitimate political authority at t1. Even 
if a governmental administrative agent or agency was acting ultra vires and/or lacked 
legitimate political authority at the time of creating the expectation at t1 or would be 
acting illegitimately in honouring the expectation at t2, the expectation can still be 
legitimate at t2 based on the responsibility of that agency for creating it. 
Now it might be objected at this stage that for administrative courts to recognise 
legitimate expectations that have been created by governmental administrative 
agencies acting ultra vires would, in effect, permit public bodies to arbitrarily extend 
their powers beyond their authority, as set down in statutes, for example. This would 
be anathema to principles of legitimate authority. For, “the court cannot through the 
doctrine of legitimate expectation require a body to do what is prohibited by statute or 
 31 
confer upon it a power which statute has not given it.”66 I would argue, however, that 
seen from the perspective of agents, the legitimacy of their expectations—that is, their 
justification or warrant for expecting, in a prescriptive as well as predictive sense, 
governmental administrative agents or agencies to act or not act a certain way—is 
simply a matter of those agents or agencies being responsible for creating the 
expectations and having been given or assuming a role responsibility, competence, or 
discretion over the relevant policies or measures. That an administrative agent or 
agency of government created an expectation whilst acting ultra vires or would be 
acting ultra vires if it honoured the expectation is beside the point as far as the 
legitimacy of the expectation is concerned, according to my Responsibility-Based 
Account.  
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the ultra vires nature of the expectation is 
irrelevant to the further question of whether or not a court should grant relief and 
enforce the legitimate expectation. On the contrary, this is where the prima facie, non-
absolute nature of the obligation specified in the Legitimate Expectations Principle 
comes directly into play. Governmental administrative agencies have an obligation to 
honour legitimate expectations they are responsible for creating unless there is a 
pressing public interest reason for them not to do so. That their doing so would 
amount to an arbitrarily extension of their powers is one such reason. But this does 
not mean that the expectations themselves have been downgraded as non-legitimate or 
illegitimate. There should be a residue of standing or legitimacy left even where a 
court does not enforce the expectation. 
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